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Chapter 7 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Wars of words: Fighting attacks on public schools |
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Under the QEO law, school boards still negotiated with teachers. However, once a school board made an offer that met the minimum wage and benefit standards set under the QEO, the board had the authority to impose that offer on its teachers and effectively end the bargaining process. Teachers could not petition to take the contract dispute to arbitration without the approval of the school board, and they could notby lawstrike. As a result, teachers had no legal means to achieve a resolution other than the one imposed by the school board under the QEO. The majority of school boards continued to bargain in good faith; but with the revenue caps forcing them to make tough spending decisions, the QEO provided them with a new, powerful weapon to take to the bargaining table with them, whether they chose to use it or not. In 1995, anti-public education forces moved to dismantle Wisconsins Department of Public Instructionwith its independently elected State Superintendentand create a cabinet-level Department of Education with an appointed secretary who would serve directly under the governors political control. Like many other anti-education initiatives, the DPI takeover was tucked safely inside the state budget, the one bill that the Legislature absolutely must pass each session. Despite a WEAC poll showing that an overwhelming 78% of Wisconsin citizens opposed the dismantling of DPI, the budget bill was passed by newly elected Republican majorities in each house, and DPI was set for elimination as of the first of the new year. WEAC successfully waged a lawsuit challenging the move to gut DPI. After a Wisconsin Supreme Court injunction staying the elimination of DPI on January 1, 1996, the Court eventually ruled 7-0 in Craney v. Thompson that the move was unconstitutional. The Department of Public Instruction was maintained as an independent agency, but the draconian cuts in the education budget left the department weakened and in the difficult position of rebuilding itself over the next several years. The DPI takeover was not the only education fight to end up in court. Several legal battles raged over education throughout the next decade, with WEAC in the middle of most of them.
In 1997, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled in favor of WEAC in its long-standing legal challenge of the governors earlier raid on the Wisconsin Retirement System. The raid had diverted hundreds of millions of dollars meant for retirement benefits for teachers and other public employees to the states general fund, allowing politicians to increase state spending without raising taxes. The raided money went toward highway funds requested by the General Motors Company for roads near its plant in Janesville, and job retraining funds for workers who lost their jobs because of massive layoffs at the Chrysler plant in Kenosha, and the effect was to weaken the fund and dilute earnings-based benefits for retirees. In another 7-0 decision, the Court ruled that the diversion of funds amounted to an illegal seizure of property from the retirees, and $200 million in back benefits was ordered returned to the Wisconsin Retirement System. Just as nice as the money, which rightly belonged to the retirement system anyway, was the Courts ruling that any such activities would be deemed illegal in the future. This was a major victory for WEAC members and WEACs highly respected team of attorneys, and the battle would likely not have been waged if WEAC had not taken the initiative to engage it. The results were not always so good, however. A year later, the state Supreme Court ruled 4-2 in favor of allowing Milwaukees private school voucher program to apply to religious schools, funneling tens of millions of dollars away from public schools to sectarian schools in Milwaukee. WEACs attempt to appeal the ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court failed in 1998, when the Court refused to hear the unions appeal. The defeat followed WEAC victories at the appellate and circuit court of appeals levels. WEAC also fought unsuccessfully against revenue caps and the QEO in court. Among all the anti-education initiatives and campaigns that emerged during the 80s and 90s, revenue caps and the Qualified Economic Offer were the most profound for educators and public schools in more ways than one. Despite the danger posed by the revenue caps and the QEO to educators and public schools, they became an energizing force for WEAC. The threat of these anti-teacher and anti-public education initiatives mobilized educators around the state and provided WEAC with a focus for its political and legislative action. Using opposition to the revenue caps and QEO as a standard for support of political candidates, WEAC was able to elect many opponents of these laws and defeat many supporters, building coalitions in the Legislature that could begin to address these issues. Progress, however, was slow, and at no time were the votes there for outright repeal of either law. Instead, friendly legislators began the process of making incremental progress on these issues. Exemptions were carved into the revenue caps for popular programs, from small class size initiatives to summer school and special education. Small adjustments were made to the QEO to loosen its constraints and provide more room for salary and benefit increases. And the steady drumbeat of opposition to the revenue caps and QEO promised more movementand even the hope for repealin the future.
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